Propositions and attitudes
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Propositions and attitudes

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Published by Oxford University Press in Oxford .
Written in English

Subjects:

  • Proposition (Logic)

Book details:

Edition Notes

Includes bibliography and index.

Statementedited by Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames.
SeriesOxford readings in philosophy
ContributionsSalmon, Nathan U., Soames, Scott.
The Physical Object
Pagination(240)p.
Number of Pages240
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL21175501M
ISBN 100198750927, 0198750919

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This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defence of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is 'psychologically real'. The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude by: Book Condition: This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings book has hardback covers. With usual stamps and markings, In good all round condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual : Hardcover. COVID Resources. Reliable information about the coronavirus (COVID) is available from the World Health Organization (current situation, international travel).Numerous and frequently-updated resource results are available from this ’s WebJunction has pulled together information and resources to assist library staff as they consider how to handle coronavirus. 1. Frege’s Puzzle. Powerful considerations developed by Gottlob Frege in his suggest that words within the scope of a propositional attitude verb cannot function as they do outside those linguistic environments. Frege presents his puzzle as one about the relationship between the cognitive value of expressions and their ordinary reference, arguing that the two must be distinct.

  Asantha U. Attanayake. Post-Colonial Curriculum Practices in South Asia: Building Confidence to Speak English. ISBN: Routledge, Author: Sabiha Huq. A propositional attitude is a mental state held by an agent toward a proposition.. Linguistically, propositional attitudes are denoted by a verb (e.g. "believed") governing an embedded "that" clause, for example, 'Sally believed that she had won'.. Propositional attitudes are often assumed to be the fundamental units of thought and their contents, being propositions, are true or false from the. Propositions and Attitudes. Nathan U. Salmon & Scott Soames This collection of readings investigates many different philosophical issues concerning the nature of propositions and the ways they have been regarded through the years. Reflecting both the history of the topic and the range of contemporary views, the book includes articles from Cited by: The term proposition has a broad use in contemporary analytic most basic meaning is a statement proposing an idea that can be true or false. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other "propositional attitudes" (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of.

Propositional attitudes: the standard account. Information-directed attitudes like know, believe, and remember are usually analysed as relations between agents and classical propositions, and referred to as propositional traditional analysis of such attitudes goes back to Hintikka (), and it lies at the heart of the framework of epistemic logic. Published in print August | ISBN: Published online October | e-ISBN: | DOI: :oso/ ISBN: OCLC Number: Notes: Chiefly revised versions of papers presented at a conference on Direct reference, indexicality, and propositional attitudes, held at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF) in . This book defends a new theory about the nature of propositional content. According to this theory, the basic bearers of representational properties are particular mental or spoken actions. Propositions are types of these actions, which we use to classify and individuate our attitudes and speech acts. This theory abandons several key features of the traditional Fregean conception of.